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In  this  study  we  re-evaluate  the  impact  of  natural  resources  on  economic  growth.  The 
reassessment is based on a growth model where, using panel-data analysis, natural-resource 
variables (geographically diffused and concentrated) affect the efficiency gains of labour and 
capital in production. We find an overall positive effect on growth arising from the increase in 
capital efficiency associated with concentrated resources, exactly the kind of resources that 
explain  the  resource  curse  in  recent  cross-section  studies.  We  detect  a  negative  effect  of 
concentrated  resources  on  labour  efficiency  only  when  either  the  resource  proxies  are 
unadjusted for re-export distortion (even with a fixed institutional quality, contrary to cross-
section  studies),  or  both  the  fixed  country  and  time  effects  are  not  considered  after  the 
referred  adjustment.  Our  results  also  dismiss  a  negative  effect  of  the  adjusted  diffuse 
resources measure on capital efficiency if we  assume a constant institutional quality,  and 
fixed country and time effects. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we reassess the impact of natural resources on economic growth. In the recent 
literature, physical limits to growth caused by natural-resource scarcity or excessive pollution 
have not been considered relevant (Nordhaus, 1992; Meier and Rauch, 2000; Romer, 2005). 
This occurs because physical limits can be overcome by technological progress, forces of 
substitution and structural change when natural-resource scarcity is reflected in market prices 
(Meier  and  Rauch,  2000).  If  there  is  open  access  to  resources,  economic  agents  must be 
forced to consider the associated social value through adequate policies and institutions. 
In a series of cross-section studies initiated by Sachs and Warner (1995), the countries’ 
natural-resource abundance has been associated with lower economic growth, an unexpected 
result  that  has  become  known  as  the  “resource  curse”.  Several  explanations  have  been 
presented, but only a recent one has been sustained by the empirical research, stressing the 
value of institutional quality (e.g., Isham et al., 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). 
The first explanations were based on the structuralist theses of the 1950s, focusing on 
the decline in the terms of exchange between primary and manufactured products (Prebisch, 
1950), the volatility of primary product prices, or the limited linkages between the natural-
resource  sector  and  the  rest  of  the  economy  (Hirschman,  1958).  However,  none  of  these 
explanations was unequivocally confirmed by empirical tests (e.g., Moran, 1983; Behrman, 
1987; Cuddington, 1992; Lutz, 1994; Dawe, 1996; Fosu, 1996). 
In  the  Dutch  Disease  thesis,  natural  resource  booms  hinder  the  industrial  sector, 
assumed  as  the  main  driving  force  of  the  economy,  either  through  real  exchange  rate 
appreciation or the absorption of production factors (Neary and van Wijnbergen, 1986). Thus, 
the expansion of the natural-resource sector is not enough to offset the negative effect of 
deindustrialisation on growth. In addition, there is a change in the composition of exports in 
favour  of  raw  materials,  or  even  a  drop  in  total  exports,  thus  reducing  economic  growth   3 
(Gylfason,  2001a).  The  empirical  evidence  did  not  provide  great  support  for  the  Dutch 
Disease as an explanation of the resource curse (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995 and 1999; Leite 
and Weidmann, 2002; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). The case study led by Auty 
(2001a) also dismisses this thesis by showing the complexity and diversity of cases among 
natural-resource abundant countries, including several exceptions to the resource curse. 
Other explanations for the resource curse, often presented autonomously, can also be 
partly considered as symptoms of the Dutch Disease, which is not supported by empirical 
studies  as  we  have  seen.  These  arguments  include  the  disincentive  for  entrepreneurship 
(Sachs and Warner, 2001), the decrease in savings and physical investment (Gylfason, 2001b) 
and lower investment in education and human capital (Gylfason, 2001a). 
Another thesis stresses the negative effect on growth caused by rent-seeking activities 
associated  with  natural-resource  abundance  (e.g.,  Torvik,  2002).  Since  natural-resource 
abundance only penalises growth in some countries, this thesis has very little explanatory 
power (Bulte et al., 2005), leading to the development of models where the results change 
according to different initial conditions (e.g., Acemoglu, 1995; Baland and François, 2000). 
Mehlum et al. (2006) conclude that the presence of better institutions can avoid the 
resource  curse,  but  they  identify  some  limitations  in  their  empirical  analysis,  namely  the 
possibility  that  natural  resources  might  influence  institutional  quality.  That  possibility  is 
recognised by the recent explanations based on endogenous institutions. Here, the kind of 
natural resource influences the institutional context, where the form of government and the 
quality of the policies are the most important aspects (Knight et al., 1996; Auty, 2001a, b; 
Ross, 2001; Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Bulte et al., 2005). 
The importance of institutions and policies in growth is supported by a vast number of 
empirical studies (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2006). Leite and 
Weidmann (2002), for example, found no direct impact of natural-resource abundance on   4 
economic growth from 1970 to 1990, but they showed an important indirect effect through the 
impact of those resources on corruption, which negatively affects growth (e.g., Mauro, 1995). 
This result was confirmed by Isham et al. (2003) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003), who examined the influence of natural resources on broader indicators of institutional 
quality and policies. They confirmed that, for a given level of institutional quality, the natural-
resource abundance has no direct impact on growth. Rather, this abundance penalises growth 
indirectly,  through  institutional  quality,  but  only  when  resources  are  geographically 
concentrated, such as oil.
3 That is, these recent studies explain the resource curse through the 
negative effect of geographically concentrated resources on the quality of institutions. 
The empirical studies on the resource curse are cross-section analyses, where countries’ 
economic growth in a single extended period is regressed to a series of explicative variables, 
including natural resources, usually outside the framework of a formal growth model. In this 
study, we broaden the scope of the literature by assessing the premise of a resource curse in a 
panel-data analysis of a growth accounting model, where natural resources (geographically 
diffused and concentrated) affect the efficiency gains of labour and capital in production. 
In growth accounting terminology, we attempt to “explain” the Solow residual in terms 
of  improvements  to  the  efficiency  of  inputs,  which,  in  turn,  are  “explained”  by  a  set  of 
variables also related to natural resources. That is, we measure the contribution of natural 
resources to economic growth through the estimation of the associated efficiency gains of 
labour and capital, along with the most important growth determinants. In order to estimate 
the unobserved levels of efficiency, we use the duality qualities/prices of production factors, 
which is also an important growth accounting result, as recently stressed by Barro (1999). 
By using panel-data analysis we increase the efficiency of our estimation, associated 
with the larger number of observations (around one thousand, arising from the available data 
                                                 
3 In turn, diffuse resources, such as agricultural and forest products, were not correlated with institutional quality.   5 
on the chosen growth determinants in two hundred and eight countries from 1970 to 2005). 
And through the developed model, we are able to control the presence of unobserved country 
and time effects, which, if not considered, lead to inconsistent estimates. Finally, taking into 
account institutional quality as a cause of labour efficiency we can show whether the recent 
explanation of the resource curse in cross-section studies is still relevant in a panel-data case. 
In short, with the estimated panel growth accounting model we intend to assess: (i) the 
effect of natural resources on economic growth through capital and labour efficiency; (ii) if 
the type of natural resources and institutional quality are relevant to that assessment, as in 
recent cross-section studies; (iii) the relative importance of the chosen growth determinants. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we deduce an estimated growth model, 
where: (i) labour and capital efficiency are determined by several variables, including natural 
resources  and  institutional  quality;  (ii)  the  first  order  condition  for  maximising  profit  in 
relation to labour is used to evaluate the contribution of the variables to real wage growth per 
worker and thus to productivity growth; (iii) the cross-section dimension is added to formalise 
the final panel model specification of the wage equation, which we differentiate according to 
the  estimation  procedures;  and  (iv)  the  wage  equation  is  also  used  to  test  conditional 
convergence. In section 3, we present and discuss the estimation results, including the growth 
decomposition  for  eight  representative  countries  in  terms  of  resource  abundance  and 
economic performance. In section 4, we summarise with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The effect of natural resources on economic growth 
In this section, we develop a growth accounting framework with factor efficiency which, 
considering panel data for 208 countries between 1976 and 2005, is used to estimate the 
contribution of natural resources to economic growth. That is, given the evidence that natural-
resource scarcity does not pose a crucial restriction on economic growth, the main concern is 
to assess the impact of the natural-resource abundance on growth. We also intend to observe   6 
whether the negative effect (resource curse) found in standard cross-section empirical studies, 
through regressions of conditional convergence, is confirmed, and to evaluate the hypothesis 
that institutional quality may explain the resource curse, as suggested by recent literature. 
In subsections 2.1 and 2.2, we build the model and make a selective review of literature 
(namely empirical) supporting the variables. The model is first derived for a single country 
(subsection 2.1) and then extended to the final panel estimation forms (subsection 2.2). 
 
2.1 Growth accounting model with factor efficiency 
Let us consider the following neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale 
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(i) Y is the real aggregate output, measured by GDP at constant prices;
4 (ii) L is the labour 
level, measured by total employment;
5 (iii) K is the aggregate capital stock at constant 1990 
dollars, calculated by the ‘permanent inventory method’ from gross capital formation data;
6 
(iv) f is the labour efficiency; (v) g is the capital efficiency; (vi)  α  is the labour share in 
production;  and  (vii) Lf  and Kg  are,  respectively,  the  labour  factor  and  the  capital  factor 
measured in units of efficiency, which compares with L and K, both expressed in conventional 
units. Thus, quality advances in physical inputs are captured by f and g in (1). 
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in which the circumflex accent conveys the growth rate of the respective variable. 
                                                 
4 Data from the United Nations (National Accounts Database). 
5 The labour series was calculated using information from several sources: the International Labour Organization 
(yearly and periodical data), the OECD (Statistics Database), the World Bank (World Development Indicators 
2007), the IMF (IFS) and the United Nations (UNECE and Statistics Division – Common Database). 
6 The source for gross capital formation data was the United Nations (National Accounts Database).   7 
As the efficiency levels f and g are not observable, we consider that they are a function 
of (and thus instrumentable by) some variables, including natural resources. The assumption 
of constant returns to scale in labour and capital means that excluded factors are insignificant 
to growth. Since apparently the natural-resource scarcity does not place a direct restriction on 
growth  (e.g.,  Nordhaus,  1992;  Romer,  2005),  the  omission  as  a  productive  factor  is  an 
adequate assumption. However, natural resources may affect labour and capital efficiency. 
Although this influence appears negative in a  cross-country  analysis  (resource curse), the 
experience of several countries shows that these resources can be well managed (for instance, 
invested in human or physical capital) and thus positively affect growth. 
 
Specification for labour efficiency 
Assuming the functional form of constant elasticity, we propose the following expression for 






































) ( , where:  (3) 
(i) F is a scale factor; (ii) I is the investment, assessed by gross capital formation at constant 
prices; (iii) T represents international trade, measured by the sum of exports and imports at 
constant  prices  in  percentage  of  GDP  (degree  of  economic  openness);  (iv)  IQ  is  the 
institutional-quality  variable,  evaluated  by  the  budget  balance  in  percentage  of  GDP;  (v) 
NresP conveys the geographically concentrated natural-resource abundance, assessed by the 
percentage of fuels, ores and metals in merchandise exports; (vi) NresD conveys the diffuse 
natural-resource abundance, assessed by the percentage of agricultural raw materials and food 
products  in  merchandise  exports;
7  (vii)  1 a   and  2 a   are  (constant)  elasticities  of  labour 
efficiency in relation to  L
I  and  L
T ; and (viii)  3 a ,  4 a  and  5 a  are (constant) semi-elasticities of 
                                                 
7 As f refers to the efficiency of each worker, the variables were divided by the number of workers, except in the 
case of IQ, which already affects the efficiency of each worker.   8 
labour efficiency in relation to IQ,  L
NresP  and  L
NresD , respectively. This set of variables is based 
on the previous studies (namely empirical) on the subject. 
Next, we present a selective review of this evidence for each variable of (3) along with 
the reasons for the chosen proxies and the way they were introduced into the specification. 
Investment, I: the contribution of investment to explain a substantial part of economic 
growth is stressed by several studies (e.g., Englander and Gurney, 1994; Maddison, 1991; 
Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). To measure I we used gross capital 
formation at constant prices (1990 US dollars).
8 
Foreign trade, T: the weight of foreign trade in GDP or degree of openness measures the 
international-competition  exposure,  which  affects  the  resource-allocation  efficiency.  The 
value of foreign trade for economic growth dates back to Adam Smith (1776) and has been 
stressed in several prominent theoretical and empirical studies (e.g., Romer, 1990; Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Rivera-Bátiz and Romer, 1991; Englander and Gurney, 1994; Frankel 
and Romer, 1999; Wacziarg, 2001; Lewer and van den Berg, 2003). To evaluate T we use the 
ratio of total exports and imports to GDP (1990 US dollars).
9 
Institutional  quality,  IQ:  the  importance  of  institutions  and  policies  on  growth  is 
supported by several empirical works (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Acemoglu et al., 
2006).  For  example,  the  effect  of  institutional  quality  on  labour  efficiency  is  analysed  in 
Mauro’s study (1995) on corruption, or in the rent seeking model of Mehlum et al. (2006). In 
this  latter  study,  natural-resource  booms  redirect  labour  from  productive  to  rent  seeking 
activities, reducing labour efficiency. In cross-section studies of Isham et al. (2003) and Sala-
i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), the institutional quality explains the resource curse. 
                                                 
8 Data from the United Nations (National Accounts Database). 
9 Data from the United Nations (National Accounts Database).   9 
In our case, the institutional-quality variable was captured by the government budget 
balance in percentage of GDP.
10 Thus, we consider that large budget deficits or their high 
variability may be signs of lower institutional quality as they show deficient macroeconomic 
government management – except the case when they are justified by the public investment 
effort, which is already reflected in the investment variable. This is in line with, for example, 
Wacziarg (2001), who showed the positive effect of macroeconomic stability on growth. 
Natural-resource variables, NresP and NresD: Isham et al. (2003) and Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) consider that natural-resource abundance has an indirect adverse effect 
on growth, by institutional quality, when resources are geographically concentrated. Using 
NresP (abundance in geographically concentrated natural resources) and NresD (abundance in 
diffuse natural resources) we intend to verify whether there is any direct impact of natural 
resources on growth through the labour efficiency factor. 
Variable NresP may not be significant or even have a positive effect if its eventual 
negative impact on growth has already been captured by IQ. The proxies used for NresP and 
NresD were, respectively, the weight of fuels, ores and metals in merchandise exports, and the 
weight of agricultural raw materials and food products in merchandise exports,
11 following 
previous studies such as Leite and Weidmann (2002). 
The weight of natural resources in exports (or in GDP) has been used as a measure of a 
country’s abundance of those resources since Sachs and Warner (1995). This is a measure of 
the country’s dependence on exports based on these resources, and as a flow, can only be 
considered an imperfect proxy of a country’s real stock of natural resources (Bulte et al., 
2005). The weight of natural resources in exports can only be a strict measure of the natural-
                                                 
10 Data from the OECD (Statistics Database), IMF (IFS), United Nations (National Accounts Database) and 
World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007). 
11 Data from the World Bank (World Development Indicators 2007).   10 
resource abundance if there is an invariable and consistent relationship between the stocks of 
resources and the annual exports of these stocks. 
In addition, the weight of natural resources in exports (or in GDP) can be considered an 
imperfect  measure  of  dependence  on  natural  resources  due  to  the  possibility  of  their  re-
exportation, which is of importance in countries like Singapore. Sachs and Warner (1995) 
adjusted this effect using the natural-resource exports net of imports in this country, but it is 
clear that using the uncorrected measure for other countries will lead to overestimation of the 
true value of natural-resource exports. We used adjusted proxies for all countries (this was 
done by subtracting the weight of natural resources in merchandise imports and adding 100 to 
get an index) and confronted the results with those obtained using the unadjusted proxies. 
To assess whether the abundance of resources is effectively a “curse” and that the results 
of the standard analyses are not spurious, Bulte et al. (2005) consider that empirical analysis 
must  be  based  on  resource  stock  measures  (see  also  Stijins,  2002).  However,  Gylfason 
(2001a)  used  the  weight  of  natural  capital  in  countries’  wealth  in  1994  (World  Bank 
estimates, 1997) and also concluded that there is an inverse relationship between countries’ 
economic growth and the natural-resource abundance assessed by that indicator (cross-section 
analysis  for  1994).  Thus,  it  seems  that,  despite  the  limitations  of  the  used  proxies,  the 
committed error should not be big enough to alter the conclusions significantly. 
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Since  f ˆ  is not observable, the first order condition for maximising profit in relation to 
labour is used to derive  f ˆ as a function of the: (i) real wage growth per worker, w; (ii) labour 
stock, L; (iii) the capital stock, K; and (iv) capital efficiency, g, which, in turn, is influenced   11 
by a set of other variables, as is shown below. From the first-order condition for maximising 
profit in relation to the labour factor,  ) ( ) (
) ( t w t L
t Y = ∂
∂ , we obtain:
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and, in terms of growth factors, 
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To some extent, wages reflect human-capital advances. Thus, the inclusion of wages 
through the use of the profit-maximising condition justifies the exclusion of human capital in 
determining f in (3) and thus in (4), as suggested by most of the theoretical  endogenous 
growth models (e.g., Lucas, 1988, and Romer, 1990), or by empirical studies supported by 
these models (e.g., Barro, 1991; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Englander and Gurney, 1994). 
In addition to human capital, the other crucial factor of long-run productivity growth is 
R&D (e.g., Englander and Gurney, 1994), which is included below in the specification of g. 
The  introduction  of  R&D  and  monopolistic  competition  in  the  growth  theory  began  with 
Romer (1987, 1990) and included seminal contributions from Aghion and Howit (1992) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991, chaps. 3 and 4). In these models, technological knowledge 
results from R&D activity as a means of obtaining some form of monopolistic power and, in 
some cases, human capital is included as an input (e.g., Blackburn et al., 2000). 
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In (7) we still need to find g ˆ , which conveys the growth of capital efficiency. 
 
Specification for capital efficiency 
                                                 
12 This was preferred to the use of the first order condition for profit maximising in relation to the capital because 
the human-capital improvements are already reflected in wages, as we explain later on.   12 
Assuming the functional form of constant elasticity, we propose the following expression for 





































) ( , where:  (8) 
(i)  G  is  a  scale  factor;  (ii) RD  stands  for  R&D,  measured  by  the  number  of  total  patent 
applications; (iii) Inf is the variable infra-structures, assessed by the number of telephone lines 
and subscriptions for mobile telephone services; (iv)  1 b and  2 b  are (constant) elasticities of 
capital efficiency in relation to RD and Inf, respectively; and (v)  3 b and  4 b  are (constant) 
semi-elasticities of capital efficiency in relation to  K
NresP  and  K
NresD , respectively.
13 
This set of variables is also based on several (namely empirical) studies on economic 
growth. Next, we present a selective review of these studies for each variable in (8). 
Technological knowledge, RD: capital is more productive if it incorporates a higher 
technological-knowledge level or if it is used to create new products or processes, aspects 
related with R&D. Empirical evidence and theoretical models of the R&D growth mechanism 
have been revealed and analysed by several authors (e.g., Griliches and Lichtenberg, 1984; 
Lichtenberg, 1993; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, chps.6 and 7). 
To measure the R&D variable, we used the number of patent applications to national 
patent offices due to the availability of data for a high number of countries and years (from 
1970 to 2005).
14 The chosen proxy has the advantage of including patent applications from 
non-residents,  which  conveys  an  interest  in  protecting  the  inventions  in  a  given  country, 
meaning it will probably benefit from the invention. That is, we measure the effect of applied 
                                                 
13 As g refers to the efficiency of each capital unit, variables were divided by K.  
14 Data from the World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO. The international applications under Patent 
Cooperation  Treaties  (PCT)  are  also  included,  both  in  resident  and  non-resident  applications.  A  single 
international patent application has the same effect as national applications filed in each designated Contracting 
State of the PCT. However, patent applications to regional patent offices (such as the European Patent Office), 
which concede protection in the area, are not reflected in our data.   13 
domestic and foreign R&D on internal capital efficiency, since we are not only interested in 
measuring the domestic inventive effort – i.e., multiple counting is not a problem. 
According to the WIPO, although patent applications assess R&D activity, three major 
reflections must be considered: not all inventions are patented;
15 the place and time of filing a 
patent application may not correspond to the place and time of the inventive activity; the 
number of patent applications may vary across countries due to differences in patent systems. 
Infrastructures, inf: it is known that capital is more productive when there are adequate 
infrastructures for economic activity and this is mainly important in less developed countries 
(e.g.,  Gordon,  2006).  Empirical  studies  seem  to  point  globally  to  a  positive  effect  of 
infrastructures  on  productivity  (e.g.,  Argimón  et  al.,  1997);  however,  results  rely  on  the 
methodology used and on the kind of infrastructures. In a seminal work, Aschauer (1989) 
found a crucial relationship between some infrastructures  (roads  and  motorways, airports, 
public  transport,  water  and  sanitation  systems,  among  others)  and  productivity,  also 
associating the smaller productivity growth in the United States in the 1970s and 80s with the 
contemporary slowing of the infrastructure investment rate. 
Ford and Poret (1991), for example, presented somewhat different results. In the case of 
the United States, and using data starting from the end of the 19
th century, they only found a 
significant  relation  between  infrastructures  and  productivity  after  the  Second  World  War. 
Using data from twelve countries of the OECD since the 1960s,
16 the authors verified that 
only half of them recorded a significant effect of infrastructures on TFP, a result that also 
differs from the previously mentioned empirical study by Englander and Gurney (1994). 
In our case, the proxy used for infrastructures is the number of telephone lines and 
subscriptions to mobile telephone services, due to the availability of data for a wide group of 
                                                 
15 Firms may choose alternative property-protection methods, such as trade secrecy or marketing techniques. 
16 The USA, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Norway, Sweden.   14 
countries  and  years  and  the  evidence  of  the  positive  impact  of  telecommunications 
infrastructure on economic growth (e.g., Roller and Waverman, 2001).
17 
Natural resource variables, NresP and NresD: here, these variables evaluate if there is 
any direct impact of natural resources on growth via capital efficiency, following the analysis 
in (3) and bearing in mind Isham et al. (2003) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). 
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Substituting  g ˆ  in (7), we have: 
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j δ =   5;   4,   3,   2,   1,   if     = j a j α 6 δ = ) 1 ( α − ;  j δ = 10   9,   8,   , 7   if   ) 1 ( 6 = − − j bj α ; u(t) is a white noise. 
We found wage data for a wide range of countries and years using labour compensation 
variation (National Accounts approach) from several sources.
18 Real wage growth per worker 
was then obtained by subtracting the product deflator growth and labour growth.
19 
The OLS estimation of (10) allows us to obtain estimates of α  (from  6 δ ),  1 a  up to  5 a  
and  1 b  up to  4 b . Next, we substitute the values found in (4) and (9) to achieve estimates for 
f ˆ and  g ˆ  (note that the tilde symbol designates estimated values): 
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17 Data from the United Nations (Common Database) and the World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007. 
18  World  Bank  (World  Development  Indicators  2007),  United  Nations  (Common  Database)  and  OECD 
(Statistics Database). 
19 The source for the product deflator was the United Nations (National Accounts Database); in some countries, 
we extended the series a few years using wage data from the IMF (IFS), since we obtained growth rates close to 
the ones obtained from the National Accounts approach.   15 
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The estimate procedure followed to attain Y
~
ˆ is thus the instrumental variables method. 
From (12) it is possible to estimate the growth in TFP, which is the part of the product 
increase in real terms not accountable by the physical growth of labour and capital factors. 
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Finally, from (11a), (11b) and (12) we can estimate the contribution to Y
~
ˆ  of  L ˆ,  K ˆ , and 
each explanatory variable of  f
~
ˆ  and  g
~
ˆ : 
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Subtracting  ) ( ˆ t L  from both sides of (14) we get an expression on labour productivity 
growth, which, as expected, is similar to (10). Indeed, the wage equation is derived from the 
first order condition for maximising profit and thus equates real wage to marginal labour 
productivity. Thus, the assessment of the resource curse is made directly in the wage equation 
(10)  through  the  analysis  of  the  sign,  intensity  and  significance  of  the  NresP  and  NresD 
coefficients as the estimates also represent the impact of those variables on economic growth. 
 
2.2 Panel estimation model 
With panel data we also have variability from country to country. Besides providing more 
information  (higher  degrees  of  freedom,  allowing  a  reduction  of  co-linearity  between  the 
explicative variables and an increased estimation efficiency), panel data enables the inclusion   16 
of some effects not considered in either sectional or temporal data alone, also providing some 
control over the problem of unobserved individual heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002). This 
econometric problem refers to the omission of unobserved variables that are correlated with 
the explicative variables, leading to inconsistent estimates. 
The estimation of panel data models requires the choice of several assumptions to deal 
with the possibility of an unobserved individual element, which, in our case, can be a country 
effect and/or a time effect. When the unobserved element is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables it is referred to as an “individual-random effect” and we use either the Random 
Effects Model (REM) or the pooled OLS model. The option depends on the variability of the 
unobserved effect, which can be tested with the  Lagrange Multiplier Test, for example – 
Wooldridge, 2002. The pooled OLS model requires the robust variance matrix estimator and 
robust test statistics due to the presence of serial correlation when we have an unobserved 
individual element. The REM estimation is made with (Feasible) Generalised Least Squares. 
When the unobserved element is correlated with the explanatory variables – this can be 
evaluated by the Hausman Test – it is referred to as a “fixed effect” and we can use either the 
Fixed Effects Model (FEM) or the first difference model. The latter model implies the loss of 
data and is only more efficient than the FEM if the disturbance term follows a random walk 
(Wooldridge, 2002). The fixed effect estimator is usually named dummy variable estimator, 
since dummy variables are used to estimate the individual effects in a panel OLS estimation. 
The FEM asks how group and/or time affect the intercept, while the REM analyses error 
variance structures affected by group and/or time (Park, 2005). In both, slopes are assumed 
unchanged. The pooled OLS model is based on the idea that countries would react in the same 
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the wage equation (10) in a panel data formulation with a constant term  0 δ  is either:   17 
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in case of the Pooled OLS and the REM with time and country effects, where  it t i it d c ω ϕ + + =  
(being i the country, ci the country effect, dt the time effect and ωit a white noise); 
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70 ˆ ,  (16) 
for the FEM with time and country effects, where  t i it d c δ ρ + + = 0 . By using the GDP per 
capita for each i in dollars,  i GDPpc70 ,
20 the latter expressions in (15) and (16) allow us to 
assess the conditional-convergence hypothesis of countries: θ<0 (θ>0) conveys a smaller 
(higher) productivity  growth in richer countries and thus the convergence (divergence) of 
countries. In general, the FEM produces more robust results since it ensures the consistency 
of estimates without loss of observations. However, if we are interested in the effect of a time-
constant variable in a panel-data study, the robustness of the fixed-effects estimator is almost 
useless (Wooldridge, 2002). In this case, the random-effects estimator is probably the only 
choice without an instrumental variable approach, but we will get an inconsistent estimate if 
the FEM is the apt model. The fixed-country effect in (16) impedes our checking conditional 
convergence: θ cannot be estimated by the FEM since  i GDPpc70  is independent of t. 
 
3. Results 
In this section we present and discuss the most relevant results concerning our panel model 
and the theoretical and empirical evidence presented above. 
First, we show the usual cross-section resource-curse presentation in Figure 1, which 
plots the growth in real GDP per capita between 1970 and 2005 for 94 countries against their 
natural-resource  abundance  in  1970,  measured  by  the  sum  of  NresD  and  NresP.
21  As 
                                                 
20 Data from the United Nations (National Accounts Database). 
21 Real GDP per capita growth obtained from United Nations (Common and National Accounts databases).   18 
expected, Figure 1 depicts the negative correlation that embodies the resource curse. This was 
also found separately for NresD and NresP, both with the unadjusted and adjusted proxies. 
Figure 1 - GDPpc average growth rate from 1970 to 2005 and resource abundance in 1970 
(unadjusted proxy)  





































The model estimation was based on information regarding 208 countries from 1970 up 
to 2005.
22 Since the panel estimation only considers the years with complete data in each 
country, we got close to one thousand observations in our regressions, corresponding to an 
unbalanced panel data for 80 countries from 1976 up to 2005 with all variables. Nevertheless, 
the capital stock includes values regarding investment beginning in 1970. Since unbalanced 
panel data may suffer from selectivity bias, Table 1 presents the estimated number of years 
for each country. An inspection of countries reveals enough variability of resource abundance 





                                                 
22 The estimation outputs were obtained with Limdep 8.0 software.    19 
Table 1 – Estimated countries and years 
Year  Year 
Country 
t=t0  t=T  Number 
 
Country 
t=t0  t=T  Number 
1  Algeria  1994  2002  9    41  Luxembourg  1999  2003  5 
2  Armenia  2003  2004  2    42  Macedonia, FYR  1996  2004  3 
3  Australia  1976  2005  30    43  Malaysia  1991  1995  5 
4  Austria  1976  2005  29    44  Malta  1976  2002  23 
5  Belarus  1998  2003  6    45  Mauritius  1990  1998  9 
6  Belgium  1976  2003  28    46  Mexico  1992  2004  13 
7  Brazil  1993  1998  3    47  Moldova  1996  2004  8 
8  Bulgaria  1996  2004  9    48  Mongolia  1996  2004  4 
9  Canada  1976  2003  28    49  Morocco  1991  1991  1 
10  Chile  1976  2004  26    50  Netherlands  1976  2005  28 
11  Colombia  1976  2002  14    51  New Zealand  1987  2004  17 
12  Costa Rica  1977  1990  9    52  Nicaragua  2000  2000  1 
13  Croatia  1997  2004  8    53  Norway  1976  2005  28 
14  Czech Republic  1996  2005  10    54  Panama  1992  1996  5 
15  Denmark  1976  2005  30    55  Peru  1993  2004  4 
16  Ecuador  1989  1994  2    56  Philippines  1999  2000  2 
17  Egypt, Arab Rep.  1978  2003  9    57  Poland  1984  2005  17 
18  Estonia  1998  2004  7    58  Portugal  1979  2003  24 
19  Finland  1976  2005  30    59  Romania  1998  2005  7 
20  France  1978  2004  27    60  Russian Federation  1996  2004  8 
21  Georgia  1998  2004  7    61  Saudi Arabia  2000  2000  1 
22  Germany  1976  2005  30    62  Singapore  1998  2004  5 
23  Greece  1988  2004  17    63  Slovak Republic  1996  2005  10 
24  Guatemala  1991  1995  5    64  Slovenia  1995  2005  11 
25  Hungary  1993  2004  12    65  South Africa  1976  2004  14 
26  Iceland  1992  2005  14    66  Spain  1990  2005  16 
27  India  1995  1998  4    67  Sri Lanka  1991  1994  4 
28  Indonesia  2004  2004  1    68  Sweden  1976  2000  25 
29  Iran, Islamic Rep.  2001  2001  1    69  Switzerland  1976  2002  26 
30  Ireland  1976  2005  29    70  Tajikistan  2000  2000  1 
31  Israel  1991  2004  12    71  Thailand  1982  2004  19 
32  Italy  1980  1985  6    72  Trinidad and Tobago  1978  2004  8 
33  Jamaica  1976  1979  4    73  Tunisia  2000  2004  5 
34  Japan  1976  2004  28    74  Turkey  1989  2003  14 
35  Kazakhstan  1995  2001  7    75  Ukraine  1999  2004  5 
36  Kenya  1986  1999  4    76  United Kingdom  1976  2005  30 
37  Korea, Rep.  1976  2004  23    77  United States  1976  2004  25 
38  Kyrgyz Republic  1998  2003  6    78  Uruguay  1994  2000  7 
39  Latvia  1995  2004  10    79  Venezuela, RB  1976  1994  15 
40  Lithuania  1994  2004  11    80  Zimbabwe  1986  1993  5 
 
Data based on authors own estimations. 
Notes: t = t0 and t = T indicate the initial and final years, respectively; and Number represents the total number of estimated 
years. 
 
Table 2 shows the main estimation results for the wage equation without the conditional 
convergence variable – (15) and (16). As the natural-resource curse explanation backed by 
cross-section studies associates the negative effect of geographically concentrated resources   20 
with a reduction in institutional quality, we estimated the wage equation with and without IQ 
to check whether it is relevant for the evaluation of the resource curse in our panel estimation. 
 
Table 2 – Wage equations (1976-2005) 
Resource 
Proxies 
Unadjusted  Adjusted 























(b)  4.027    4.234    4.235    4.436   
LM 
(c)  6.24    9.09    3.80    6.80   
Hausman 
(d)  77.96    81.89    102.49    106.02   





















































































































































































































































































Observations  1086  1086  1005  1005  1086  1086  1005  1005 
R
2  0.461  0.214  0.495  0.232  0.462  0.203  0.495  0.219 
Adjusted R
2  0.394  0.206  0.427  0.223  0.395  0.195  0.427  0.210 
 
Notes: T-ratios appear below the coefficients’ estimates. 
*, 
** and 
*** mean that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
(a) G&T stands for a joint Group (country) and Time effect. 
(b) The F test determines the choice between 
the Pooled OLS Model and the FEM 
(c) The LM test determines the choice between the Pooled OLS Model and the REM. 
(d) 
The Hausman test determines the choice between the FEM and the REM. In the F, LM and Hausman tests we prefer the 
joint time and country effect model to models with only one of those effects whenever the G&T test statistics are significant.   21 
The first regressions were estimated keeping the natural-resource variables unadjusted 
for the re-exportation distortion (Sachs and Warner, 1995, corrected this for Singapore) as in 
most empirical studies. In the last regressions, we remove the problem, by using the adjusted 
proxies, and find whether the correction is relevant for the resource-curse proof or dismissal. 
We present the FEM results with country and time effects since, according to the test 
statistics, it is always the most adequate estimation procedure. Under fixed-country effects, 
the inclusion of the convergence variable renders inconsistent estimates, since only the Pooled 
OLS or the REM procedure can be used – estimation form (15). In any case, it can be shown 
that the convergence variable is statistically insignificant with the Pooled OLS and the REM 
in view of the different scenarios for inclusion of IQ and the adjustment of resource variables. 
In  addition  to  the  FEM  results,  we  also  present  the  inconsistent  estimates  from  the 
pooled OLS approach, which is the panel data equivalent to the classic regression model used 
in  the  traditional  cross-section  analyses  of  the  resource  curse  (e.g.,  Sachs  and  Warner, 
1995).
23 In this way, we can observe whether the consideration of the fixed country and time 
effects is important for the confirmation or dismissal of the resource-curse hypothesis. 
 
Wage equation with unadjusted resource variables and without IQ  
In the first regression of Table 2, the wage equation is estimated with the unadjusted resource 
variables and leaving out IQ. The estimates represent the impact of the explanatory variables 
on real wage growth per worker,  w ˆ , and thus on output growth, Y ˆ, – see (15).
24 Investment, 
trade and infrastructure variables are all significant at 1%. In the R&D variable we introduced 
two lags to capture a significant positive impact on w ˆ  (and Y ˆ), which only occurs a year after 
the application was filed, with a significance level of 10% in this first regression. The variable 
                                                 
23 Remember that, in addition to the inclusion of the time dimension in panel data, our pooled OLS estimations 
differ from the usual cross-section results due to the use of a growth model with factor efficiency. 
24 The estimated impact of  K ˆ  on  Y ˆ  is given in Table 2 by the coefficient of ) ˆ ˆ ( L K − , which we then subtract 
from 1 to obtain the contribution of  L ˆ .    22 
is not significant in the first and third years, but its final impact is positive, although smaller 
than expected, reflecting the limitations of the available proxies – see subsection 2.1. 
The coefficient of  ) ˆ ˆ ( L K − , 26,1% (significant at 1%), is the estimated product elasticity 
in relation to capital and is below the usual reference of one third (Romer, 2005). Concerning 
the natural-resource variables, only  K
NresP  has a positive crucial effect (significant at 5%); i.e., 
the relative abundance in NresP is beneficial to Y ˆ through  g ˆ  when the proxy is unadjusted for 
the re-exportation distortion. This impact overcomes the negative effects of  L
NresD  and  L
NresP  on 
f ˆ  (both significant at 10%). Variable  K
NresD  has no impact with a significance level of 10%. 
The Pooled OLS estimates are similar in signal and magnitude, except in the case of 
K
NresD  (which is significant at 1% with a negative signal) and  L
NresD  (which is significant at 1% 
with a positive signal). We also find higher significance levels of the resource estimates in the 
Pooled OLS estimation. The combined effect of natural resources on  w ˆ  (and thus on  Y ˆ) 
remained positive, due to the positive effect of  K
NresP  (and, to a smaller extent, of  L
NresD ) on  g ˆ , 
which more than compensated for the negative effects of  K
NresD  and  L
NresP . However, now the 
estimates are inconsistent since there is statistical evidence of fixed country and time effects.
25 
Overall, the first two regressions with unadjusted resource proxies dismiss the resource-
curse hypothesis found by the cross-section studies (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995). The FEM 
regression shows that the negative impact on Y ˆ coming from the reduced  f ˆ  caused by  L
NresD  
and  L
NresP  is more than compensated for by the increase in  g ˆ  associated with  K
NresP , which is 
exactly the type of resource that explains the curse in most recent cross-section studies (e.g., 
Isham et al., 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003), where it is linked with a reduction 
of institutional quality – we take into account this variable in regressions 3 and 4 of Table 2. 
                                                 
25 As stated, the reason for the analysis of the pooled OLS estimates is to assess whether the presence and correct 
estimation of the referred effects is important to the confirmation or dismissal of the resource curse hypothesis.   23 
The dismissal of the curse is reinforced by the presence of fixed country and time effects 
in the FEM estimation since  K
NresD  does not present the significant negative impact found in 
the inconsistent pooled OLS estimates (this more than compensates for the positive influence 
of  L
NresD  found with this procedure), which do not take into account the referred effects. 
 
Complete wage equation with unadjusted resource variables 
The third and fourth regressions in Table 2 show the FEM with country and time effects and 
pooled OLS estimations of the complete wage equation using the unadjusted natural-resource 
proxies. In both cases, IQ has a positive and significant (at 1%) effect on  w ˆ  and  Y ˆ. The 
addition of IQ only slightly alters the magnitude of the other coefficients, so the previous 
conclusions remain unaltered. Thus, the positive effect of  K
NresP  still overcomes the negative 
effect on  f ˆ  induced by  L
NresP  and/or  L
NresD . This means that, in contrast with recent cross-
section studies, the negative effect of  L
NresP  on  f ˆ  persists with a fixed IQ. 
Let  us  now  see  if  these  conclusions  still  stand  when  we  adjust  the  natural-resource 
variables to correct the distortion introduced by the re-exportation of these resources. 
 
Wage equation with adjusted resource variables and without IQ  
When we leave out IQ  and use the adjusted  resource proxies, some resource coefficients 
become non-significant or change signal in the FEM with country and time effects estimation 
(see the fifth and the first regressions in Table 2), and the remaining estimates present similar 
values. We find that the resource variables have no impact on  f ˆ  and that  K
NresD  has a negative 
effect on  w ˆ  (and Y ˆ), with a significance level of 10%. Variable  K
NresP  has a smaller positive 
effect on  w ˆ  (and Y ˆ), still significant at 5%, compared to the first regression, but higher than 
the negative effect of  K
NresD . Thus, the final impact of natural resources is still favourable.   24 
Country and time fixed effects are decisive in explaining most of the changes as we find 
no major differences in the pooled OLS regression when we use the adjusted resource proxies 
(basically,  K
NresP  has now a smaller effect – see the sixth and second regressions of Table 2). 
 
Complete wage equation with adjusted resource variables  
Including IQ,  K
NresD  becomes non-significant at 10% in the FEM with country and time effects 
(see the seventh and the fifth regressions in Table 2), and the effect of natural resources on w ˆ  
(and  thus  on  Y ˆ)  is  positive  and  comes  from  the  increased  g ˆ   due  to  K
NresP .  However,  its 
estimate is smaller and less significant (at only 10%) than before. Again, fixed country and 
time effects are crucial in explaining the changes associated with IQ since the pooled OLS 
estimation remains essentially the same (see the eighth and the sixth regressions in Table 2). 
As before, IQ has a positive effect on w ˆ  in both estimations (with a significance level of 5%). 
In the final FEM with country and time effects (seventh regression in Table 2), the 
product elasticity in relation to capital is 29.9% (significant at 1%), slightly below the usual 
one third estimated with the share of income paid to capital. The effects of investment and 
trade  to  w ˆ   (and  Y ˆ)  per  worker  are  similar  (significant  at  1%)  and  slightly  less  than  the 
estimate for infrastructures. The positive effect of R&D (significant at 10%) occurs with a one 
year lag and is much smaller than expected due to the limitations of the available proxies.
26 
Therefore, there is no evidence of a resource curse in our panel-data analysis of a growth 
model where the resource variables affect labour and capital efficiency. If the natural resource 
proxies are unadjusted for the re-exportation distortion, as in most cross-section studies, the 
adequate fixed-effect model estimation (FEM with country and time effects estimation) shows 
that the negative impact of  L
NresD  and  L
NresP  on  f ˆ  (the effect of  L
NresP  persists keeping IQ 
                                                 
26 Considering R
2 as a measure of fit to our final estimation, the explanatory variables, with fixed country and 
time effects, capture 49.5% of the variation in w ˆ  (the adjusted R
2 is slightly lower, close to 43%).   25 
constant, in contradiction to the most recent cross-section studies) is more than compensated 
for by the positive effect on  g ˆ  arising from  K
NresP . 
When  we  use  the  adjusted  resource  proxies  in  the  fixed  effects  model  there  is  no 
significant impact of natural resources on  f ˆ . We also obtain a smaller positive effect of  K
NresP  
on  g ˆ   but  bigger  than  the  negative  impact  now  coming  from  K
NresD   that  becomes  non-
significant considering IQ, and therefore the overall impact of natural resources is favourable. 
The positive impact of NresP may reflect the effects associated with economies of scale, 
and capital and technological intensity owing to the exploitation of those resources. Since 
poor  institutional  quality  seems  to  induce  a  loss  of  capital  efficiency  in  diffuse  natural-
resource abundant countries,
27 we can consider that better policies and institutions are needed 
to offset low capital level and technological intensity in the exploitation of those resources. 
Comparing these final results with those of the inconsistent pooled OLS estimates, we 
find that the presence of fixed country and time effects dismiss the significance of both the 
negative effect of diffuse resources on capital efficiency and the impact of resources on labour 
efficiency, which are negative if they are concentrated and positive if they are diffuse. 
 
Estimated growth decomposition 
Based on the seventh regression in Table 2, we now analyse the evolution of real GDP growth 
and the estimated GDP growth decomposition for some representative countries in terms of 
resource abundance and economic growth. First, we ranked the countries in Table 1 according 
to the adjusted resource-abundance measures. Then, we chose a country above and another 
below the average of 1.55% of GDP per capita growth between 1970 and 2005,
28 from those 
with  high  and  low  measures  of  resource  abundance  for  each  type  of  natural  resource 
(geographically diffused and concentrated), reaching a selection of eight countries. 
                                                 
27 In our case IQ is only introduced in f, and we could not estimate the direct effect on g at the same time. 
28 For the countries included in the UN National Accounts Database.   26 
Although only concentrated natural resources have a statistically significant and positive 
effect on growth by capital efficiency, if we add the other statistically non-significant effects 
of natural resources we reach a global average impact of -1.60 percentage points, p.p.; i.e., the 
average  positive  effect  on  estimated  growth  of  K
NresP   (1.50  p.p.)  is  reverted  to.
29  In  the 
remainder of the analysis, we will stress the natural-resources significant positive impact. 
Below, we present a brief analysis for each selected country. The first conclusion that 
emerges is the close connection between estimated and actual growth over the period. As for 
the estimated country effects, they were only significant at 10% for Algeria and Venezuela. 
 
(i) Low NresD adjusted measure and below average economic growth – The Algeria case 































Notes: the lines represent real GDP growth, actual and estimated values; the lines with shaded areas below stand for the 
physical impacts of the labour and capital stocks to the estimated GDP growth in each year; the columns constitute the TFP 
impact disaggregated between the several items; here, the rectangles with dots are the fixed country and time effects which, 
along with the blue-grey area (the constant term of the wage equation), constitute the share of GDP growth not accountable 
by the explanatory variables; the rectangles associated with labour efficiency are illustrated with ascending lines, while the 
ones related to capital efficiency have descending lines; the impacts of natural resources by labour and capital efficiency are 
highlighted by an orange background. 
                                                 




NresD  and 
K
NresD  are all statistically non-significant, we find that the 
average negative effect in labour efficiency (-1.77 p.p. due to 
L
NresP  and 0.02 p.p. owing to 
L
NresD ) more than 
offsets the average favourable effect in capital efficiency (1.50 p.p. due to 
K
NresP  plus -1.35 p.p. owing to 
K
NresD ).   27 
Figure 2 shows the estimated growth decomposition for Algeria in the period 1994-
2002. In terms of the estimated growth factors, the most positive impacts come from labour 
and the effect of infrastructures and concentrated natural resources via capital efficiency. The 
most negative impact arises from the fixed-country effect, explaining the fall in estimated 
product  in  the  majority  of  the  period.  We  also  find  a  negative  influence  of  concentrated 
resources via labour efficiency, but, as already mentioned, this is statistically non-significant. 
 
(ii) Low NresD adjusted measure and above average economic growth – The Japan case 























































Japan has a relative scarcity of diffuse and concentrated natural resources, explaining 
the null related effects to estimated growth in Figure 3. The good economic performance up to 
the 1990s is mostly associated with the physical impacts of capital and labour, followed by 
the positive effect of trade and investment via labour efficiency. This is partially offset by the 
negative  effect  of  institutional  quality  via  labour  efficiency,  which  increases  after  2000, 
explaining the lower estimated growth along with the slowdown of labour and capital. From 
the mid 90s, there is also a positive impact of infrastructures through capital efficiency. 
   28 
(iii) High NresD adjusted measure and below average economic growth – The New Zealand case 





























Figure 4 depicts the decomposition for New Zealand for 1987-2004.
30 Estimated growth 
is hindered up to 1992 by the drop of the labour stock, along with the negative impacts of 
investment and institutional quality via labour efficiency, which are positive in the following 
years. The better performance after 1992 is also associated with the capital growth and the 
strong effect of infrastructures via capital efficiency. In the whole period, we also find a stable 
positive effect of trade (via labour efficiency) and concentrated natural resources (via capital 
efficiency). Concentrated resources also have a negative effect via labour efficiency, which, 
as the negative effect of diffuse resources via capital efficiency, is statistically non-significant. 
 
(iv) High NresD measure and above average economic growth – The Iceland case 
Unlike the previous cases, for Iceland the fixed-country effect is positive and explains most of 
the estimated GDP growth, but, as mentioned before, is non-significant. We stress the strong 
positive  impact  of  concentrated  resources  via  capital  efficiency  and,  in  some  years,  the 
                                                 
30 We found other countries with lower adjusted NresD values and below average economic performance – 
Kenya, Guatemala and Uruguay –, but with only a few estimated years.   29 
favourable effects coming from investment, trade (via labour efficiency), infrastructures or 
R&D (via capital efficiency). We also see negative impacts of concentrated resources via 
labour efficiency and of diffuse resources via capital efficiency, both non-significant. 






























(v) Low NresP adjusted measure and below average economic growth – The Switzerland case 



















































   30 
In this case we show the estimated growth decomposition for Switzerland.
31 The high 
impact  of  labour  to  estimated  growth  was  replaced  after  1992  by  the  growing  effect  of 
infrastructures via capital efficiency. Even though we chose a country with a below average 
adjusted measure of concentrated natural resources, we have a negative impact associated 
with this kind of resource via labour efficiency. This seems stronger than the positive effect 
via capital efficiency, but, as already stated, only this last impact is statistically significant. 
 
(vi) Low NresP adjusted measure and above average economic growth – The South Korea case 
























































Besides the high impact of both labour and capital stocks on estimated South Korean 
growth, we stress the positive impact coming from trade, investment and institutional quality 
via labour efficiency for most years. We also find an important effect of infrastructures up to 
1988 and from 1997 to 1999. The effect of natural resources is small and only visible up to 
the early 90s, where the positive impact of concentrated resources via capital efficiency is 
similar to the negative effect via labour efficiency, which is, however, non-significant. 
 
 
                                                 
31 Guatemala has lower adjusted NresP values, but it only has a few estimated years.   31 
(vii) High NresP adjusted measure and below average economic growth – The Venezuela case 






























The most positive effect to Venezuela’s growth comes from labour, followed by capital, 
and the effect of infrastructures and concentrated natural resources via capital efficiency.
32 In 
addition, we find negative effects of concentrated resources via labour efficiency and also of 
diffuse  resources  via  capital  efficiency,  but  they  are  non-significant.  Moreover,  trade, 
investment and institutional quality hinder economic growth via labour efficiency in several 
years. The negative fixed-country effect also penalises growth. 
 
(viii) High NresP adjusted measure and above average economic growth – The Norway case 
Moreover the positive contribution of labour and capital to Norway’s growth, we stress the 
favourable  impacts  of  institutional  quality  and  trade  via  labour  efficiency  and  also  of 
infrastructure and concentrated natural resources via capital efficiency.
33 Concentrated natural 
resources also have a negative effect via labour efficiency, but this is non-significant. 
                                                 
32 Similar values for adjusted NresP are presented in other countries, which also have low economic performance 
(e.g., Saudi Arabia and Algeria) but with fewer estimated years. 
33 Similar adjusted NresP values are presented by Trinidad and Tobago, but only a few years are estimated.   32 
























































4. Concluding remarks 
In this study we re-evaluated the impact of natural resources on economic growth. Having 
realised that the physical restrictions related to natural resources are not decisive to economic 
growth,  we  focused  on  its  negative  correlation  with  resource  abundance  found  in  cross-
section  studies,  a  result  that  was  named  the  ‘resource  curse’.  Several  theories  have  been 
presented to justify this surprising result, but only a recent one was sustained by empirical 
cross-section studies, explaining the ‘resource curse’ by the negative effect of geographically 
concentrated resources on institutional quality, which in turn favours economic growth. 
Bearing in mind these results, we developed a growth model to estimate the contribution 
of natural resources in a panel data analysis (which allows an increased estimation efficiency 
and the control of unobserved individual heterogeneity) and found no evidence of a ‘resource 
curse’.  In  our  model,  the  natural-resource  variables  (geographically  diffused  and 
concentrated)  affect  the  efficiency  gains  of  labour  and  capital  in  production.  The  Solow 
residual is ‘explained’ in terms of improvements to the efficiency of inputs, which depend on   33 
a set of variables also related to natural resources. In order to estimate the unobserved levels 
of efficiency, we used the duality qualities/prices of production factors. 
If the natural resource proxies are unadjusted for the re-exportation distortion, as in most 
cross-section  studies,  we  find  in  a  fixed  effect  model  that  the  negative  impact  of  both 
geographically  diffused  and  concentrated  resources  on  labour  efficiency  (this  last  impact 
endures with a constant institutional quality, contrary to the recent cross-section studies) is 
overcome by the positive effect on capital efficiency coming from concentrated resources. 
Using the adjusted resource proxies in the fixed effects model there is no significant 
impact of natural resources on labour efficiency. There is also a smaller positive effect of 
concentrated resources on capital efficiency but greater than the negative one issued from 
diffuse  resources,  which  is  non-significant  under  a  fixed  institutional  quality.  This  last 
variable has a positive and significant (at 5%) effect on growth. Comparing these results with 
the inconsistent pooled OLS estimates, fixed country and time effects dismiss the significant 
negative effect of diffuse resources on capital efficiency  and the impacts of resources on 
labour efficiency, which are negative if they are concentrated and positive if they are diffuse. 
We conclude that natural resources have a positive impact on economic growth through 
the increased capital efficiency of concentrated resources, thus dismissing the hypothesis of a 
resource curse. The positive effect seems to reflect the capital and technological intensity 
usually associated with the exploration of those resources, in addition to economies of scale. 
In the final FEM regression, the product elasticity in relation to capital has a value 
slightly below the reference level of one third. The contributions of investment and trade to 
real wage and product growth per worker are similar and slightly smaller than the estimate for 
infrastructures. All these coefficients have a significance level of 1%. The positive impact of 
R&D only occurs with a one year lag (significance level of 10%) and is much smaller than 
anticipated due to the limitations of the available proxies.    34 
We also tested and rejected the hypothesis of conditional convergence, but this could 
not be done appropriately due to the presence of fixed-country effects. 
Finally, we decomposed the estimated economic growth for eight selected countries in 
terms of resource abundance and growth. Even though only concentrated natural resources 
have a significant and positive effect on growth via capital efficiency, we also measured the 
other  contributions  of  natural  resources  to  growth.  Among  the  selected  countries,  Iceland 
presented the highest impact of concentrated resources via capital efficiency (4.66 p.p., on 
average), contributing to its good economic performance from 1992 to 2005. Venezuela and 
Norway, which were selected for their abundance in this type of resource, presented smaller 
ratios in relation to capital and thus lower contributions of concentrated resources (1.2 p.p. 
and  0.3  p.p.  on  average,  respectively)  in  comparison  with  Iceland  –  other  not  selected 
countries, such as Malta, presented even higher impacts associated with this type of resource. 
From the growth decompositions of Venezuela and Norway we conclude that concentrated 
resources  can  benefit  growth  through  capital  efficiency,  but  this  may  not  prove  decisive. 
Venezuela has a higher impact of concentrated resources, but, contrary to Norway, presents 
negative  contributions  from  important  growth  factors  such  as  trade,  investment  and 
institutional quality across several years, which justify the lower rates of economic growth. 
 
References  
Acemoglu, D. (1995), “Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent”, European Economic Review, 
vol. 39(1), pp. 17-33. 
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A. (2006), “Economic backwardness in political perspective”, American 
Political Science Review, vol. 100(1), pp. 115-131. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, D. (2006), “Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run 
growth”, in Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf.   35 
Aghion, P., Howitt, P. (1992), “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”, Econometrica, vol. 
60(2), pp.323-351. 
Argimón, I., Gonzalez-Paramo, J.M., Roldan, J.M. (1997), “Evidence of public spending crowding-out 
from a panel of OECD countries”, Applied Economics, vol. 29(8), pp. 1001-1010. 
Aschauer, D.A. (1989), “Is public expenditure productive?”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 
23(2), pp. 177-200. 
Atkinson,  G.,  Hamilton,  K.  (2003),  “Savings,  growth  and  the  resource  curse  hypothesis”,  World 
Development, vol. 31(11), pp. 1793–1807. 
Auty, R.M. (2001a), Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Auty,  R.M.  (2001b),  “The  Political  Economy  of  Resource-driven  Growth”,  European  Economic 
Review, vol. 45(4), pp. 839-846. 
Baland J.M. and Francois, P. (2000), “Rent Seeking and Resource Booms”, Journal of Development 
Economics, vol. 61(2), pp. 527-42. 
Barro,  R.  J.  (1991),  “Economic  growth  in  a  cross-section  of  countries”,  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics, vol. 106(2), pp. 407-443. 
Barro, R. (1999). “Notes on growth accounting.” Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 4(2), pp. 119-137. 
Barro, R. J., Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004), Economic Growth, McGrawHill. 
Behrman,  J.  (1987),  “Commodity  price  instability  and  economic  goal  attainment  in  developing 
countries”, World Development, vol. 15(5), pp. 559–573. 
Benhabib, J., Spiegel, M. (1994), “The role of human capital in economic development: evidence from 
aggregate cross-country data”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.34(2), pp. 143-173. 
Blackburn, K., Hung, V.T.Y. and Pozzolo, A.F. (2000), “Research, development and human capital 
accumulation.” Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 22(2), pp. 189-206. 
Bulte,  E.,  Damania,  R.,  Deacon,  T.  (2005),  “Resource  Intensity,  Institutions,  and  Development”, 
World Development, vol. 33(7), pp. 1029–44. 
Coe, D.T., Helpman, E. (1995), “International R&D spillovers.”, European Economic Review, vol. 
39(5), pp. 859-897.   36 
Cuddington, J. T. (1992), “Long run trends in 26 primary commodity prices: A disaggregated look at 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis”, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 39(2), pp. 207–27. 
Dawe, D. (1996), “A new look at the growth in developing countries”, World Development, vol. 
24(12), pp. 1905-1914. 
Englander,  A.,  Gurney,  A.  (1994)  “La  productivité dans la  zone de  L’OCDE:  les  déterminants a 
moyen terme”, Revue économique de l’OCDE, nº 22, Printemps, pp.53-119. 
Ford, R., Poret, P (1991), “Infrastructure and private-sector productivity”, OECD Economic Studies 
vol. 17, Autumn, pp. 63-89. 
Fosu, A. (1996), “Primary exports and economic growth in developing countries”, World Economy, 
vol. 19(4), pp. 465–475. 
Frankel, J.A., Romer, D. (1999), “Does trade cause growth?”, American Economic Review, vol. 89(3), 
pp. 379-399. 
Gordon, R.J. (2006), Macroeconomics, 10
th ed., Pearson/Addison Wesley. 
Griliches, Z., Lichtenberg, F. (1984), “R&D and productivity growth at the industrial level: is there 
still  a  relationship?”  in  Zvi  Griliches  (ed.),  R&D,  Patents  and  Productivity,  pp.  465-496, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Grossman,  G.,  Helpman,  E.  (1991),  Innovation  and  growth  in  the  global  economy,  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, MIT Press. 
Gylfason,  T.  (2001a),  “Natural  Resources,  Education  and  Economic  Development”,  European 
Economic Review, vol. 45(4), pp. 847-859. 
Gylfason,  T.  (2001b),  “Natural  resources  and  economic  growth;  what  is  the  connection”,  CESifo 
working papers, nº 50. 
Hirschman, A. (1958), The strategy of economic development, New Haven: Yale University 
Press.  
Isham, J., Woodcock, M., Pritchett, L., Busby, G. (2003), “The Varieties of Resource Experience: 
How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth”, 
Middlebury College Economics Discussion Paper 03-08, Vermont: Middlebury College.   37 
Knight, M., Loyaza N., Villaneuva D. (1996), “The peace dividend: military spending and economic 
growth”, IMF Staff Papers, vol. 43(1), pp. 1-37. 
Leite,  C.,  Weidmann,  J.  (2002),  “Does  mother  nature  corrupt?  Natural  resources,  corruption  and 
economic  growth”,  G.  Abed  &  S.  Gupta  (Eds.),  Governance,  corruption,  and  economic 
performance, pp. 156–169, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Levine, R., Renelt, D. (1992), “A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth regression”, American 
Economic Review, vol. 82(4), pp.942-963. 
Lewer, J.J., van den Berg, H. (2003), “How large is international trade’s effect on economic growth?”, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, vol.17(3); part 3, pp.363-396. 
Lichtenberg, F. (1993), “R&D investment and international productivity differences” in Horst Siebert 
(ed.), Economic Growth in the World Economy, pp. 89-110, Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 
Lucas, R.E. (1988), “On the mechanics of economic development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
vol.22(1), pp. 3-42. 
Lutz, M. (1994), “The effects of volatility in the terms of trade on output growth: New evidence”, 
World Development, vol. 22(12), pp. 1959–1975. 
Maddison,  A.  (1991),  Dynamic  forces  in  capitalist  development     a  long run  comparative  view, 
Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 90, pp. 681-712. 
Mehlum,  H.,  Moene,  K.,  Torvik,  R.  (2006),  “Institutions  and  the  resource  curse”,  The  Economic 
Journal, vol. 116(508), pp. 1-20. 
Meier, Gerald M., Rauch, James E. (2000), Leading Issues in Economic Development, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Moran, C. (1983), “Export fluctuations and economic growth”, Journal of Development Economics, 
vol. 12(1), pp. 195-218. 
Neary,  P.,  van  Wijnberger,  S.  (1986),  Natural  Resources  and  the  Macroeconomy,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nordhaus, W.D. (1992), “Lethal Model 2: The Limits to Growth Revisited”, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, vol. 2(1), pp.1-43.   38 
Park, H;M (2005), “Linear Regression Models for Panel Data Using SAS, STATA, LIMDEP, and 
SPSS”, 2005 2008 The Trustees of Indiana University (4/13/2008). 
Available at www.indiana.edu/~statmath/stat/all/panel/panel.pdf . 
Prebisch, R. (1950), The economic development of Latin America and its principal problems, New 
York: United Nations. 
Rivera-Bátiz,  L.,  Romer,  P.  (1991),  “International  trade  with  endogenous  technological  change”, 
European Economic Review, vol.35(4), pp.971-1001. 
Roller, L.W., Waverman, L. (2001), “Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: 
A Simultaneous Approach”, The American Economic Review, vol. 91(4), pp. 909-923. 
Romer,  P.M.  (1987),  “Growth  Based  on  Increasing  Returns  Due  to  Specialization”,  American 
Economic Review, vol. 77(2), pp. 56-62. 
Romer, P.M. (1990), “Endogenous technological change”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98(5), 
pp. S71-S102. 
Romer, D. (2005), Advanced Macroeconomics 3
rd ed., McGraw-Hill. 
Ross, M. L. (2001), “Does oil hinder democracy?”, World Politics, vol. 53(3), pp. 325–361. 
Sachs,  J.D,  Warner,  A.M.  (1995),  “Natural  Resource  Abundance  and  Economic  Growth”,  NBER 
Working Paper Series, 5398, Cambridge. 
Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M. (1999), “The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth”, Journal of 
Development Economics, vol. 59(1), pp. 43-76. 
Sachs, J.D, Warner, A.M. (2001), “The Curse of Natural Resources”, European Economic Review, 
vol. 45(4), pp. 827-838. 
Sala-i-Martin, X., Subramanian, A. (2003), “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration 
from Nigeria”, NBER Working Paper Series, 9804, Cambridge. 
Smith, A. ([1776] 1976), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, R.H. 
Campbell, A.S. Skinner and W.B. Todd, (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Tan,  G.  (1983),  “Export  instability,  export  growth  and  GDP  growth”,  Journal  of  Development 
Economics, vol. 12(1), pp. 219–227.   39 
Torvik,  R.  (2002),  “Natural  Resources  Rent  Seeking  and  Welfare”,  Journal  of  Development 
Economics, vol. 67(2), pp. 455-70. 
Wacziarg, R., (2001), “Measuring the dynamic gains from trade”, World Bank Economic Review, vol. 
15(3), pp.393-429. 
Wooldridge,  J.  M.  (2002),  Econometric  Analysis  of  Cross  Section  and  Panel  Data,  MIT  Press, 
Cambridge, MA 
World Bank (1992), “Overview: Development and the Environment”, World Development Report 
1992, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.1-5. 
World Bank (1997), “Expanding the measure of wealth: Indicators of environmentally sustainable 
development”,  Environmentally  Sustainable  Development  Studies  and  Monographs  Series, 
vol.17, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators 2007, World Bank, Washington, DC. Recent FEP Working Papers 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ % $ ￿! ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿) * ￿! ￿￿￿) ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿$ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿( $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ + $ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿, ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿- . / 0 1 ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿2￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿
+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿# 7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ + + ￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) 1. ￿1￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿8￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ % $ ￿! ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿$ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿. ￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
# 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
! ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿#￿5 ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿6 7 8 6 ￿￿￿￿6 7 8 9 ￿￿￿# 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 9 ￿
￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :￿ ￿ :; ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿< ￿ ￿ 1 = ￿:> ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ? ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿> ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ? ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
# ￿ " ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿: ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿; ￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿ " ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿. ￿￿￿1& ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿! ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿% ￿￿% ￿￿￿2 ￿#￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿( ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿  ￿
A ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿3￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿, ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿. ￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿$ ￿; $ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿= ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ , ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :> ￿ ￿ . ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿B ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿. ￿￿￿
￿+ ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿ = ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :> ￿ ￿ . ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿B ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿> ? ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿? ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿@   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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# ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :> ￿ ￿ . ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿B ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿A ) ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿> ? ￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿> ? ￿￿￿￿-B ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿> ? ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :￿ ￿ :; ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿<￿ ) ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :> ￿ ￿ . ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ :> ￿ ￿ . ? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ? ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% $ ￿; ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ % $ ￿! ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<￿ ￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿. ￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ % $ ￿! ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿#￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#, ￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿  ￿
# ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ % $ ￿! ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<! ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿) ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿D ! ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿
# ￿ " ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿<$ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿#￿￿￿ ￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿D ! , ￿￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ , ￿
￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿ / ￿ ￿￿<3￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿
’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ / ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<% ￿￿@ ￿￿￿￿￿￿E ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿@ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿F 6 7 7 7 1G H H 8 I , ￿￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 8￿ # ￿ " ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿<￿! $ ￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿#￿￿￿- . / ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿$ ￿; $ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿
￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- . / ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
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! $ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ $ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿B $ ￿5 ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿( $ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿B ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿￿- $ # 7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ > $ ￿
B ￿ ￿. ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿% ￿￿￿￿ & 1! " ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- . / ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿
￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿￿$ ￿; ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿<￿ ) ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿#￿￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿ + ￿
" ￿￿#￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- . / ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿
- . / 0 1 ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿2￿ ￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿</ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿! ￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿ 4 / ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> $ ￿￿$ ￿￿$ ￿( ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿5 ￿ D ￿￿% ￿ ￿E ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ ￿% $ ￿% $ ￿( ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿) ￿-￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’  ￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ ￿% $ ￿% $ ￿( ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> $ ￿￿$ ￿￿$ ￿( ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿<￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿
￿￿￿￿) ￿-￿￿￿￿  ￿J ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’ ’ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿6 ￿. ￿ ￿ ￿# 7 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
’ ￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿3￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’ , ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿> $ ￿￿$ ￿￿$ ￿( ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿2 ￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿
A ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
& ￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’ 8￿
; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! $ ￿; ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿$ ￿; $ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ ￿% $ ￿! ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<￿ ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿K ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿J ￿. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
. ￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿# 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿
# ￿ / F ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<-￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿# 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿, 9 ￿
￿ ￿ / ￿ D . ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ 4 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 G . ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿<￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿+ ￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿; ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿9 G ￿￿￿￿￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿9 7 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ . ? ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿$ ￿; $ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿<￿ ￿￿￿= ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿#￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
A ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
+ ￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿. ￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿$ ￿; $ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# $ ￿( $ ￿; $ ￿# ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿￿<’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿,  ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ " ￿ ￿ ? ) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# 7 ￿ ￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿<￿ ￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿! $ ￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿, ’ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿￿$ ￿; $ ￿B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿<’ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿. ￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿